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Abstract 
We address the problem of causal interpre­
tation of the graphical structure of Bayesian 
belief networks (BBNs). We review the con­
cept of causality explicated in the domain of 
structural equations models and show that it 
is applicable to BBNs. In this view, which 
we call mechanism-based, causality is defined 
within models and causal asymmetries arise 
·, when mechanisms are placed in the context of 
· a system. We lay the link between structural 
equations models and BBNs models and for­
mulate the conditions under which the latter 
can be given causal interpretation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Although references to causality permeate everyday 
scientific practice, the notion of causation has been one 
of the most controversial subjects in the philosophy of 
science. Hume's critique that causal connections can­
not be observed, and therefore have no empirical basis, 
strongly influenced the empiricist framework and refo­
cused the concept of causality to scientific models as 
opposed to reality. A strong attack on causality was 
launched in the beginning of this century by Bertrand 
Russel, who, observing the developments in areas of 
physics such as gravitational astronomy, argued that 
causality is a "relic of bygone age," for which there is 
no place in modern science.1 Philosophical attempts 
to capture the meaning of causation and reduce it to 
a theoretically sound and meaningful term succeeded 
only in part. Although they exposed and clarified sev­
eral important issues related to the concept of causal­
ity and its use in science, no known philosophical def­
inition of causation is free from objections or exam­
ples in which it seems to fail. This has created an 
atmosphere of suspicion towards the very concept. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that many scientists are 
rather careful in using the term causality, preferring 
1 He later retreated from this extreme view, recognizing 
the fundamental role of causality in physics. 
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neutral mathematical terms like "functional relation" 
or "interdependence." Still, capturing the asymme­
tries implied by causality seem to be an inherent part 
of scientific practice. 
The confusion about the meaning of causality is clearly 
seen in the domain of probabilistic and decision­
theoretic models based on Bayesian belief networks 
(BBNs) (Pearl, 1988) and influence diagrams (Howard 
& Matheson, 1984). On one hand, the directionality of 
arcs brings into a model asymmetric relations among 
variables, which some theoreticians have associated 
with cause-effect relations (e.g., Pearl (1988), Lau­
ritzen and Spiegelhalter (1984)). In causal discovery 
work (Spirtes et al. (1993), Pearl and Verma (1991)), 
the relation between causality and probability is bound 
by a set of axioms that allow for causal inference. How­
ever, the faithfulness (or minimality) assumption in 
causal discovery is too restrictive for a definition of 
causality: it is possible for a causal graph to produce 
an unfaithful probability distribution. Some theoreti­
cians pointed out that BBNs are simply a mathemat­
ical formalism for representing explicitly dependences 
and independences, and that there is no inherent re­
lation of directed arcs with causality in the formalism 
(e.g., Howard and Mathesson (1984)). After all, the 
arcs can be reversed simply by application of Bayes' 
rule, whereas causality cannot. 
There seems to be little doubt that the notion of 
causality is useful in probabilistic models. There is 
strong evidence that humans are not indifferent to 
causal relations and often give causal interpretation to 
conditional probabilities in the process of eliciting con­
ditional probability distributions (Tversky & Kahne­
man, 1977). Henrion (1989) gives an appealing practi­
cal example when a little reflection on the causal struc­
ture of the domain helps a domain expert to refine the 
model. Discovery of the fact that an early version of 
a model violates conditional independence of variables 
(a consequence of the Markov property) leads the ex­
pert to realize that there is an additional intermediate 
node in the causal structure of the system and subse­
quently to refine the model. The probabilistic conse­
quences of the causal structure, in terms of the pat­
tern of dependences, are so strong that an expert seek-
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ing to fulfill the Markov condition, in fact, often ends 
up looking for the right causal model of the domain. 
Even those holding the strict "probabilistic influence" 
view admit that experts often construct influence di­
agrams that correspond to their causal models of the 
system (Shachter & Beckerman, 1988). The same can 
be said about the user interfaces to decision support 
systems: having a model that represents causal inter­
actions aids in explaining the reasoning based on that 
model. Experiments with rule-based expert systems, 
such as Mycin, have indicated that diagnostic rules 
alone are not sufficient for generating understandable 
explanations and that at some level a model incorpo­
rating the causal structure of the domain is needed 
(Clancey, 1983; Wallis & Shortliffe, 1984). 
Usefulness for human interfaces is not the only rea­
son for capturing causality in probabilistic models. 
As long as the only goal of using a model is pre­
diction of a probability distribution given some ev­
idence (this is the case in typical diagnostic tasks), 
the notion of causality is technically not useful. Con­
sider, for example, a model consisting of two variables: 
weather and barometer. Given the outcome of one of 
the variables, we can do extremely well in predicting 
the probability distribution of the other. The prob­
lems will begin when we want to predict the effect of 
a "change in structure" of our system, i.e., the change 
in some mechanism in the system through an external 
intervention. 2 Without knowing the direction of the 
causal relation between the weather and the barome­
ter, we cannot tell whether a manual manipulation of 
the barometer will affect the weather. If this problem 
sounds unrealistic, cqnsider a public policy decision re­
garding, for example, banning products that are high 
in cholesterol, given their observed probabilistic asso­
ciation with heart disease. Without the information on 
the causal interaction between cholesterol intake and 
cholesterol blood level, and then cholesterol blood level 
and heart disease, we can at best predict the effect of 
our policy decision on the amount of cholesterol in­
take but not its ultimate effect on heart disease. The 
effect of a structural change in a system cannot be 
induced from a model that does not contain causal in­
formation. Having the causality right is crucial for any 
policy making. 
One never deals with changes in structure in the do­
main of decision analysis - all policy options and in­
struments that are expected to affect a system are 
explicitly included in the decision model. Whatever 
causal knowledge is necessary for building this model 
is assumed to be possessed by the decision maker, and 
is captured in the conditional probability distributions 
in the model. The decision maker is assumed to know 
that, for example, manipulating the barometer will not 
2This problem has been known in philosophy as the 
"c'Bttnterlactualtonditionai,• as it involves evaluation of a 
counterfactual predicate: "if A were true, then B would be 
the case." See Simon and Rescher (1966) for a discussion 
of the role of causality in counterfactual reasoning. 
affect the weather. The problem is pushed away from 
the formalism to the interaction between the decision 
analyst and the decision maker and, effectively, since 
reference to causality seems to be unnecessary in de­
cision models, decision theorists and decision analysts 
can afford to deny any connection between direction­
ality of arcs and causality.3 
While one can get away with such a finesse in decision 
analysis, causal knowledge needs to be made explicit in 
situations where the human-model loop is less tight. 
The ability to predict the effect of changes in struc­
ture is important for intelligent decision support sys­
tems that autonomously generate and evaluate various 
decision options (intelligent planners). To be able to 
perform this task, they need a way to compute the ef­
fect of imposing values or probability distributions on 
some of the variables in a model. This can be done only 
if the model contains information about the causal re­
lations among its variables. 
What, in our opinion, deters decision theorists from 
explicitly including causality in their models is a lack 
of a theoretically sound and meaningful representation 
of causality within probabilistic models. In this paper, 
we propose that the meaning of causality provided by 
Simon (1953) within structural equations models is ex­
tendible to BBNs and can fill the existing niche. :Jn 
short, the answer given in this paper is that BB:Ns, 
taken as a pure formalism, indeed have nothing in 
them that would advocate a causal interpretation of 
the arcs. Probabilistic independences in themselves 
do not imply a causal structure and a causal struc­
ture does not necessarily imply independences. To give 
the arcs a causal interpretation, additional assump­
tions are necessary. Those researchers who give BBNs 
the interpretation of causal graphs are justified in do­
ing so in as much as these assumptions hold in their 
graphs. We make these assumptions explicit, and we 
hope that this will contribute to reconciling the two 
views of BBNs. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
We first review the principles underlying structural 
equations models and Simon's procedure for extract­
ing the causal ordering from such models (Section 2). 
Then, in Section 3, we demonstrate that any BBN 
model can be represented by a simultaneous equations 
model with hidden variables. Using this result, in com­
bination with the assumption of acyclicity of BBNs, we 
outline the conditions under which a BBN can be given 
a causal interpretation. 
3Decision nodes in influence diagrams are a clear ex­
ception: both incoming and outgoing arcs can be given a 
causal interpretation. The arcs coming into a decision node 
denote relevant information, known prior to the decision, 
that has impact on the decision (i.e., causes the decision 
maker to choose different options). The arcs coming out 
of a decision node stand for manipulation of the model's 
variables or, if they go to the value node, the impact on 
the overall utility of the decision. 
2 SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS 
MODELS 
Pieces of the real world that can reasonably be stud­
ied in isolation from the rest of the world, are often 
called systems. Systems can be natural (the solar sys­
tem) or artificial (a car), can be relatively simple (a 
pendulum) or extremely complex (the human brain). 
Although systems are always interlocked with the rest 
of the world, one can make a strong philosophical ar­
gument that they usually consist of strongly intercon­
nected elements, but that their connections with the 
outside world are relatively weak (Simon, 1969). This 
property allows them to be successfully studied in iso­
lation from the rest of the world. 
Abstractions of systems, used in science or everyday 
thinking, are often called models. There is a large va­
riety in the complexity and rigor of models: there are 
informal mental models, simple black-box models, and 
large mathematical models of complex systems involv­
ing hundreds or thousands of variables. A common 
property of models is that they are simplifications of 
reality. By making simplifying assumptions, a scientist 
often makes it practically possible to study a system 
but, on the other hand, automatically changes the fo­
cus of his or her work from reality to its model. 
One way of representing models is by sets of simulta­
neous equations, where each equation describes a func­
tional relation among a subset of the model's variables. 
Such models are usually self-contained in the sense 
that they have as many equations as they have vari­
ables and, by virtue of the fact that they describe an 
existing system, have at least one solution and at most 
a denumerably infinite set of solutions. Often, equa­
tions contain so called error variables, variables that 
are exogenous and usually independent by assumption, 
and which represent the joint effect of other variables 
that one is unwilling or unable to specify. 
A generic form of an equation that will be used 
throughout this paper is 
(1) 
where f is some algebraic function, its arguments x1, 
x2, ... , Xn are various system variables, and E is an 
error variable. This form is usually called an implicit 
function. In order to obtain a variable x; (1 � x; � n) 
as a function of the remaining variables, we must solve 
the equation ( 1) for :c;. We say that the function 
Xi :=g(xl,X2, ... ,x;_l,Xi+l, ... ,Xn,£) (2) 
found in this way is defined implicitly by (1) and that 
the solution of this equation gives us the function ex­
plicitly. Often, the solution can be stated explicitly 
in terms of elementary functions. In other cases, the 
solution can be obtained in terms of an infinite series 
or other limiting process; that is, one can approximate 
(2) as closely as desired.4 
4Some implicit functions have no solutions in specified 
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2.1 STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
As, in most mathematical formalisms, certain classes 
of transformations are solution-preserving, any model 
of a system can have many forms, equivalent with re­
spect to the set of solutions. Each such form is an 
algebraic transformation of some other form. 
For each natural system, there is one form that is spe­
cially attractive because of its relation to the causal 
structure of the system. It is a form in which each 
equation is structural, in the sense of describing a con­
ceptually distinct, single mechanism active in the sys­
tem. An example of a structural equation might be 
f = ma, where f stands for a force active in the sys­
tem, m for the mass of a system component, and a 
the acceleration of that component. Another equation 
might be p = C1 - C2d, where p stands for the ·price 
of a good, d stands for the demand for that good, and 
cl and c2 are constants. 
The concept of a structural equation is not mathemat­
ical, but semantic. Consequently, there is no formal 
way of determining whether an equation is structural 
or not. Structural equations are defined in terms of the 
mechanism that they describe. The notion of a mecha­
nism can be operationalized by providing a procedure 
for determining whether the mechanism is present and 
active or not. Sometimes a mechanism is visible and 
tangible. One can, for example, expose the clutch of 
a car and even touch the plates by which the car's 
engine is coupled with the wheels. One can even pro­
vide a graphic demonstration of the role of this mecha­
nism by starting the engine and depressing the clutch 
pedal. Often, especially in systems studied in social 
sciences, a mechanism is not as transparent. Instead, 
one often has other clues or well-developed and empir­
ically tested theories of interactions in the system that 
are based on elementary laws like "no action at a dis­
tance" or "no action without communication" (Simon, 
1977, page 52). Structural equations may be formed 
entirely on the basis of a theory or consist of princi­
ples derived from observations, knowledge of legal and 
institutional rules restricting the system (such as tax 
schedules, prices, or pollution controls), technological 
knowledge, physical, chemical, or social laws. They 
may, alternatively, be formed on a dual basis: a the­
ory supported by systematically collected data for the 
relevant variables. 
A variable is considered exogenous to a system if its 
value is determined outside the system, either because 
we can control its value externally (e.g., the amount 
of taxes in a macro-economic model) or because we 
believe that this variable is controlled externally (like 
the weather in a system describing crop yields, market 
prices, etc.). Equations specifying the values of ex­
ogenous variables form a special subclass in an struc-
domains- the equation f(x, y) = x2 + y2 + 1 = 0, for ex­
ample, is satisfied by no real values. All implicit functions 
referred to in this paper are assumed to have solutions. 
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tural equations model. An equation belonging to this 
subclass usually sets the value of a system's variable 
to a constant, expressing the fact that the value of 
that variable is determined outside the modeled sys­
tem, hence, the variable is exogenous to the system. 
Often, the core of a simultaneous structural equations 
model of a natural system will contain fewer equations 
than variables, hence, forming a system that is under­
determined. Only the choice of exogenous variables 
and the subsequent addition of equations describing 
them makes the system self-contained and solvable for 
the remaining (endogenous) variables. Whether a vari­
able is exogenous or endogenous depends on the point 
of view on the system that one is describing. The 
boundaries that one decides to put around the system 
and one's ability to manipulate the system's elements 
are ctucial for which variables are exogenous and which 
are endogenous in that system. A variable that is ex­
ogenous in a simple system may become endogenous 
in a larger system. 
In a structural equation describing a mechanism M 
fM(Xl, Xz, Xg, ... , xn, t:) = 0, 
the presence of a variable Xi means that the system's 
element that is denoted by x; directly participates in 
the mechanism M. If a variable xi, in turn, does not 
appear in this equation, it means that Xj does not 
directly participate in M. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will use matrix nota� 
tion for presence and absence of variables in equations 
within a system of simultaneous structural equations 
and will call such a matrix a structure matrix. 
Definition 1 (structure matrix) The 
structure matrix A of a system S of n simultaneous 
structural equations e1, e2, ... , en with n variables 
x1, x2, ... , Xn is a square n x n matrix in which ele­
ment (ij) (row i, column j) is non-zero if and only if 
variable xi participates in equation ei. Non-zero ele­
ments of A will be denoted by X (a capital letter X} 
and zero elements by 0. 
Note that the structure matrix is used for notational 
convenience only and does not mean that the discus­
sion of simultaneous equations models is restricted to 
linear models. 
Example: The following simple model, consisting of 
a set of simultaneous linear structural equations (along 
with the structure matrix), describes our perception of 
the interaction among the percentage of drunk drivers 
on the road (d), frequency of car accidents (a), and 
ratio of mortalities to the total number of people in­
volved in these accidents (m). 
[ (ei) 
(e2) 
(ea) 
m 
0 
0 
X 
a d l 
0 X 
X X 
X 0 
(3) 
Note that each equation describes what we believe to 
be a mechanism. Drinking and accidents are involved 
in a mechanism- being under influence of alcohol in­
teracts with driving abilities and effectively increases 
the likelihood of an accident (equation e2) . Mortal­
ity is involved in a mechanism with car accidents, but 
not with the percentage of drunk drivers (equation es). 
Our assumption here was that drinking is not involved 
in a direct functional relation with mortality. Further, 
as we believe that none of the variables in the model 
can affect d, we made it an exogenous variable ( equa­
tion el)· cl and c2 are constants (positive or nega­
tive) and error variables are specified by a probabil­
ity distribution. Note, that algebraically, this model is 
equivalent to the following (we preserved for the sake of 
demonstration the original constants and error terms): 
{ m + C2a + d = £1 + £s 
a+C1d=t:2 
m+ C2a =£s 
(4) 
We do not consider this later model to be structural, 
because the first equation would suggest a single mech­
anism involving drinking, accidents, and mortality. 
This violates our view of the mechanisms operating in 
this system and is, therefore, not structural. Still, this 
model has the same numerical solution as the model 
in (3). o 
Simultaneous structural equations models have been a 
standard way of representing static systems in econo­
metrics (Hood & Koopmans, 1953). Structural form 
is the most natural form of building a model - one 
composes a system modularly from pieces based on 
available knowledge about the system's components. 
Yet, the main advantage of having a structural model 
of a system is that it can aid predictions in the presence 
of changes in structure. We will end this section with 
a discussion of this important property of structural 
equations models. 
It is easy to observe that simultaneous structural equa­
tions models imply asymmetric relations among vari­
ables. Consider the example model given in (3). A 
change in the error variable t:1 will affect the value of 
d directly, and the values of a and m indirectly. A 
change in t:s, in turn, will affect only variable m and 
leave all other variables unchanged. 
A change in the structure of a system is modeled in a 
straightforward way in a simultaneous structural equa­
tions model: one alters or replaces the equations rep­
resenting the modified mechanisms. Consider, for ex­
ample, a policy that makes seat belts mandatory. We 
add a new variable b standing for the belt usage (ex­
pressed, for example, by the ratio of the drivers who 
use belts after the policy has been imposed). Since 
the belt use is determined exogenously with respect to 
the system, we add an equation for b. By virtue of 
their design, it is reasonable to assume that seat belt 
usage interacts directly with accident mortality rate, 
hence, the mechanism that the new policy modifies is 
that described by the equation involving m. 5 The new 
5If there were reasons to believe that seat belts usage 
model will, therefore, take the following form: 
{ 
d= E1 m a d 
j l 
[hi 0 0 X a+ C1d = £2 ( e2) 0 X X (5) m + C2a + C3b = £4 ( e3) X X 0 b = £5 
( e4) 0 0 0 
It follows from the modified version of the model that 
a change in £5 will only affect b and then m. The 
values of d and a are uniquely determined by the first 
and second equations, hence, will remain unaffected 
by the change in structure. This agrees with our intu­
ition that mandatory seat belts will not affect drivers' 
drinking habits and the number of accidents. If the 
model involved an alternative form of the equations, 
such as (4), we would have been in general unable to 
determine the effect of a change in the structure of the 
model. As it is impossible in such a form to identify 
the equations describing the altered mechanisms (note 
that in (4) m and a appear in two equations), it is not 
obvious which equations need to be modified and how. 
2.2 CAUSAL ORDERING 
This property of simultaneous structural equations 
models was made explicit by Simon (1953), who 
pointed out that interactions among variables in a self­
contained simultaneous equations models are asym­
metric and that this asymmetry leads to an ordering 
of the variables. He developed an algorithm for ex­
tracting this ordering and argued that, if each equa­
tion in the model is structural and each variable in 
the model that is assigned a constant value is an ex­
ogenous variable, then this ordering has a causal inter­
pretation. Causal ordering is a mechanical procedure 
that retrieves the dependency structure in a set of si­
multaneous equations. This structure will correspond 
to the interactions in the real world in so far as the 
model corresponds to the real world. 
The procedure of extracting the causal ordering from 
a simultaneous structural equations model works 
roughly as follows. A set of equations is self-contained 
if it has as many equations as variables and if every 
subset of equations has at least as many variables as 
equations. So a set of n equations is self-contained 
if it contains n unknowns and if every subset of m 
equations has at least m variables. Mechanisms in 
real-world systems often involve small number of ele­
ments, leading to structure matrices with many zeros. 
A set of structural equations will usually contain sub­
sets that are self-contained (i.e., they also consist of 
as many equations as variables). A subset of k equa­
tions with k variables is called a subset of degree k. 
Simon proved that intersections of self-contained sub­
sets are self-contained, thereby proving the existence 
of a minimal self-contained subset, i.e., one that does 
not have self-contained subsets (in the worst case, this 
was involved in the mechanism that leads to an accident, 
we might have modified equation e2 as well. Similarly, 
drinking might affect the probability of seat belt use and, 
hence, be implicated in the equation e4• 
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subset will be equal to the entire set). The procedure 
recursively identifies minimal self-contained subsets, 
solves them for the variables that they contain, and 
substitutes the obtained values for each occurrence of 
each variable in the remaining equations. Note that 
these variables are exogenous to the subsets identified 
at a later stage. The procedure stops when no self­
contained subsets can be identified. A self-contained 
subset is defined to be of order k if it was identified and 
solved at step k of this procedure. The order in which 
the subsets were identified defines the causal ordering 
of the equations and variables. Variables exogenous 
to a subset are the direct causal predecessors of the 
variables in that subset. It is possible to construct a 
causal graph of the system by representing each vari­
able in the system by a node and drawing directed arcs 
to each node from its direct causal predecessors. For 
the formal description of the procedure, see (Simon, 
1953). 
Example: The causal ordering procedure applied to 
the model described by ( 5) will first identify equations 
e1 and e4 as two self-contained structures of degree 
one. Both equations contain only one variable and, 
hence, are minimal subsets of zero order. There are 
no other such subsets. Solving e1 for d and e4 for b, 
and substituting these values in e2 and e3, yields one 
self-contained structure of degree one, notably equa­
tion e2. Since we are in step one of the procedure, 
e2 is an equation of first order. Solving e2 for a and 
substituting this value in e3, we are left with a sin­
gle equation as the minimal self-contained subset of 
second order. The resulting causal ordering is: 
b 
0 
Causal ordering is an asymmetric relation between 
variables, determined by a collection of mechanisms 
embedded in a system. It is defined formally in the 
context of models of real-world systems, whose prim­
itives are equations describing mechanisms acting in 
these systems. Mechanisms, as opposed to causal con­
nections, are usually perceptible and, hence, form a 
sound operational basis for the approach. But none 
of these mechanisms determines the causal ordering in 
isolation: causal ordering is a property of a whole sys- •: 
tern rather than of an individual equation. We will 
subsequently call this view of causality mechanism­
based to reflect its reliance on the notion of mechanisms 
in defining the causal structure of a system. 
Causal ordering is qualitative in nature, in the sense 
that it does not require full algebraic specifications of 
the equations in the model. Actually, knowledge of 
which variables in a model participate in which equa-
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tions is sufficient. This, in turn, is equal to the knowl­
edge of whether an element of the structure matrix is 
non-zero. Actual values of the coefficients (including 
their signs) and the algebraic form of the equations 
can remain unspecified. 
No scientist will claim that a model he or she has 
proposed is the true model of the real-world system 
and, in that sense, the causal structure explicated by 
the procedure of causal ordering is to a certain ex­
tent subjective. ·It is as good as the current state of 
knowledge, as the physical, chemical, or social laws, 
and as good as the real-world measurements that it 
is based on and the approximations that the scientist 
was willing to make. This subjectivity seems to be an 
irreducible property of models, but luckily a property 
that is comparable to the subjectivity of science. 
A possible criticism of causal ordering might be that 
it adds nothing new: whatever it produces is already 
embedded in the equations. Causality, in particular, 
must have been encoded in each of the equations by 
the author of the model. This critique is misplaced, 
however, because there is nothing in a typical equa­
tion that would suggest asymmetry. Causal ordering 
of variables becomes apparent only when the equation 
is placed in context. For example, the only informa­
tion captured by structural equations for a bridge truss 
might be the points through which it is connected with 
the rest of the bridge. It is the context, the equations 
describing the remaining components of the bridge 
that will determine the role of the truss in the causal 
structure of the bridge and the direction of causality. 
The direction of the causal relation in one system can 
be easily reversed in another system. What causal or­
dering accomplishes is to explicate the asymmetry of 
the relations among variables in a simultaneous struc­
tural equations model once such a context has been 
provided. 
The work on causal ordering originated in economet­
rics, where it was initially shown in the context of 
deterministic linear models (Simon, 1953) . It was 
demonstrated to apply equally well to logical equa­
tions models (Simon, 1952) and linear models with 
error variables (Simon, 1954). It was shown to pro­
vide an interesting basis for treatment of the coun­
terfactual conditional (Simon & Rescher, 1966). Re­
cently, the method has been extended to non-linear 
and dynamic models, involving first-order differential 
equations (Iwasaki, 1988) and was shown to provide a 
sound basis for qualitative physics (Iwasaki & Simon, 
1986) and non-monotonic reasoning (Simon, 1991). 
3 CAUSALITY IN BAYESIAN 
BELIEF NETWORKS 
It is often the case that, although something is known 
about the qualitative and statistical properties of a 
system's mechanisms, the exact functional form of the 
system's interactions is unknown. BBN models rep-
resent all interactions among a system's variables by 
means of probability distributions and, therefore, sup­
ply a way to model such cases. 
The pure mathematical formalism of BBNs is based 
on factorization of the joint probability distribution 
of all variables in the model. Since this factorization 
is usually not unique, many equivalent models can be 
used to represent the same system, just as was the 
case with the simultaneous equations models. Mod­
els are strongly preferred that represent probabilistic 
independences explicitly in their graphical structure. 
Such models minimize the number of arcs in the graph, 
which in turn increases clarity and offers computa­
tional advantages. 
Historically, BBN models were developed to represent 
a subjective view of a system elicited from a deci­
sion maker or a domain expert (Howard & Matheson, 
1984) . Although there are several empirically tested 
model-building heuristics, there are no formal founda­
tions and the process is still essentially an art. Decision 
makers are usually encouraged to specify variables that 
are directly relevant probabilistically (or causally) to 
a variable and influence that variable directly. These 
variables neighbor one another in the graph and a di­
rected arc is drawn between them. Often, the direction 
of this arc reflects the direction of causal influence, as 
perceived by the decision maker. Sometimes, the di­
rection of the arc reflects simply the direction in which 
the elicitation of conditional probabilities was easier. 
While it is certainly not the case that every directed 
arc in a BBN denotes causality, the formalism is capa­
ble of representing asymmetry among variables and, 
thereby, causality. This section examines the condi­
tions under which one can reasonably interpret the 
structure of a BBN as a causal graph of the system that 
it represents. We will approach the problem of spec­
ifying these conditions by comparing BBNs to struc­
tural equations models. Our intention is not to replace 
BBNs with structural equations models, but to inte­
grate the existing body of work on modeling natural 
systems, structure, and causality. 
The argument contained in this section consists of 
three steps. First, we demonstrate that BBN models 
can be represented by simultaneous equations models, 
that is, that the joint probability distribution repre­
sented by any BBN model 8 can also be represented 
by a simultaneous equations model S (Theorem 1). 
We then show that the structure of 8 is equivalent to 
the structure of a causal graph of S obtained by the 
method of causal ordering (Theorem 2). But the struc­
ture of 8 reflects the causal structure of the underlying 
system if and only if the structural model of that sys­
tem shares the structure of S (Theorem 3). So, we can 
reduce the semantic constraints on the structure of 8 
to the constraints on the structure of S. 
The following theorem demonstrates that the joint 
probability distribution over n variables of a BBN can 
be represented by a model involving n simultaneous 
equations with these n variables and n additional inde­
pendently distributed latent variables. We prove this 
theorem for discrete probability distributions, such as 
those represented by variables in BBNs. Intuitively, 
it appears that this theorem should extend to contin­
uous distributions, although we leave the problem of 
demonstrating that this is in<:jeed the case open. 
Theorem 1 (representability) Let B be a BEN 
model with discrete random variables. There exists a 
simultaneous equations modelS, involving all variables 
in B, equivalent to B with respect to the joint probabil­
ity distributions over its variables. 
Proof: The proof is by demonstrating a procedure 
for constructing S. A BBN is a graphical represen­
tation of a joint probability distribution over its vari­
ables. This joint probability distribution is a product 
of the individual probability distributions of each of 
the variables. It is, therefore, sufficient to demonstrate 
a method for reproducing the probability distribution 
of each of the variables in B. For the sake of simplicity, 
the proof is for BBNs with binary variables. Extension 
to discrete variables with any number of outcomes is 
straightforward. The outcomes of a variable x will be 
denoted by X and X. For the sake of brevity, we will 
use Pr(X) to denote Pr(x =X). 
We will construct one equation for each of the vari­
a:hles. Each equation will include an independent, con­
tmuous latent variable £, uniformly distributed over 
the interval [0, 1]. Note that Vx (0 < x � 1) Pr(E � 
x) = x. We start with an empty set S and then, for 
each variable y in B, we add one equation to S in the 
following way. 
If y has no predecessors, then the probability distribu­
tion_:>£ its outcomes is the prior distribution, Pr(Y), 
Pr(Y). The following deterministic equation with a 
latent variable £ reproduces the distribution of y: 
f 
( 
£) = { Y if E � Pr(Y) 
Y Y if E � Pr(Y) 
If y does have direct predecessors x1, x2, ... , Xn, each 
of the variables Xi (I :::; i � n) having outcomes Xi 
and xi' then its probability distribution is a distri­
bution conditional on all possible outcomes of these 
predecessors (values t:i are introduced for the sake of 
brevity in future references to individual conditional 
probabilities) . 
Pr(YIX1, X2, ... , Xn) = E1 
Pr(YIX1, X2, ... , Xn) = E2 
Pr(YjX1,X2, ... ,Xn) = E3 
Pr(YIX1, X2, . . . , Xn) = £4 
Pr(YIX1,X2, ... ,Xn) = E2" 
The following deterministic equation with the latent 
variable E reproduces the distribution of y: 
/y(xl, a:2, · . .  , Xn, £) = 
= 
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y if :r:l:;:: Xl, X2 == Xz, .. . , Xn:;:: X,., t: < el 
or x1 = X1, "'2 = X2, ... , "'"=X,, t:-< C2 
or Xl = xl, "'2 = Xz, ... , "'"=X,., t: �£a 
or x-1 = X1, r2 = x2, . . . , "'" = x ,., e 5 £4 
or x-1 = X1, r2 = Xz, ... , x-,. =X,., t: 5 Ezn 
Y if x1:::: X.!.!.."'2 == Xz, .. . , x-,.:::: X,.,£> £1 
or "'1 = xl. "'2 = Xz, .. . , Xn = x .. , e > f:z 
or XI= X1, x2 = X2, . . . , :r:,. =X,, C > C3 
or "'1 = X t. "'2 = X 2, . . .  , :r:" :::: X n, t: > £4 
. . . 
orxl =XI, "'2 = Xz, . . . , Xn =X,., e > £2" 
The above demonstrates that the value of any node in 
a BBN can be expressed by a deterministic function 
of the values of all its direct predecessors and a single 
independently distributed latent variable. For a BBN 
with n nodes, we have constructed a self-contained set 
of n simultaneous equations with n variables and n 
independent uniformly distributed continuous latent 
variables. The probability distribution of each variable 
in S is identical to the distribution of a corresponding 
node in B. This makes S equivalent to B with respect 
to the joint probability distribution of the variables. 
0 . 
The construction of an equivalent simultaneous equa­
tions model S for a BBN B, outlined in the above 
proof, is rather straightforward. The goal is to de­
scribe each element of the conditional probability ma­
trix of a node y in B. Each logical condition on the 
right-hand side of the equations specifies one element 
of this matrix by listing a combination of outcomes of 
parents of y. The exact numerical value of the condi­
tional probability for that element is then given by the 
probability of an event involving the latent variable £. 
Example: Let B be a BBN with nodes x and y. 
X y 
o--.0 
Let 
_
the distribution of x be Pr(X) = 0.4, 
Pr(X) = 0.6, and the conditional distribution of y 
be Pr(YIX) = 0.7, Pr(YIX) = 0.2, Pr(YIX) = 0.3, 
Pr(YIX) = 0.8. 
A simultaneous equations model for B is: 
{ x if t:� < 0.4 
== 
X if ex :( 0.6 
== ,!: �fx=X,£y50.7or'x=!!._,Cy50.2 
Y 1f r =X, t:y 5 0.3 or :c = X ,  E11 c:; 0.8 
0 
BBNs are acyclic, which excludes self-contained struc­
tures of degree higher than one. It is, therefore, obvi­
ous that the converse of Theorem 1 is not true. For 
example, models with feedback loops cannot be repre­
sented by BBNs. 
The following theorem establishes an important prop­
erty of a structural equations model of a system with 
an assumption of causal acyclicity. This property im­
plies that the structure obtained by the method of 
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causal ordering from a structural equations model S 
constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 reflects the 
structure of the equivalent BBN B. 
·Theorem 2 (acyclicity) The acyclicity assumption 
in a causal graph corresponding to a self-contained sys­
tem of equations S is equivalent to the following condi­
tion on S: Each equation e; E S: f(x1, • • •  , Xn, £;) = 0 
forms a self-contained system of some order k and de­
gree one, and determines the value of some argument 
x j (1 5 .i 5 n} off, while the remaining arguments of 
f are d�rect predecessors of Xj in causal ordering over 
s. 
Proof: I � I Acyclicity, according to the procedure 
of causal ordering, means that in the process of ex­
tracting the causal ordering from S, there is no self­
conta�n�d structure of degree higher than one (i.e., 
contammg more than one equation). We will show 
that given the assumption of acyclicity, the structure 
matrix A of the equations in Sis triangular. Then, by 
the considerations analogous to Gaussian elimination 
and by causal ordering the theorem follows. 
We will transform A into a lower-triangular matrix 
by a series of operations involving row interchanges 
and column interchanges. Both operations preserve 
�he ca
_
usal ordering of.variables in S: row interchange IS eqmvalent to changmg the order of equations in S· 
column interchange is equivalent to renaming the vari� 
ables in S. Both the order of equations and names of 
variables are insignificant and do not depend on the 
f�nctional form of equations. We will work along the 
diagonal from the upper-left to the lower-right corner 
and always rearrange rows below and columns to the 
right of the current diagonal element. 
Since all self-contained structures in S are all of de­
gree one, we know in the beginning (row 0 and column 
0) that there will be at least one equation containing 
only one variable. Suppose row i describes the coeffi­
cients of such an equation. We know that there will be 
only one non-zero coefficient in this equation. If this 
coefficient is located in column j, we interchange row 
0 with row i and column 0 with column j. Now, the 
first element on the diagonal (first pivot) will contain 
a non-zero; all other elements in row 0 will be zeros. 
Now we proceed with the next pivot. Processing the k­
th pivot, we are by assumption guaranteed that in the 
sub-matrix [k : n; k: n] there will be at least one self­
contained structure of degree one, which means that 
there will be at least one row with only one non-zero 
element. Suppose, it is row i and the non-zero element 
is in column j. We then interchange row k with row i 
and column k with column j. Since the k-th pivot is 
the only non-zero element in the current k-order self­
contained structure, all elements to the right of it are 
zeros. Note also that this interchange does not affect 
the zero elements above diagonal in the rows 0 to k -1 
since all columns from k to n had their elements 0 t� 
k - 1 equal to zero. 
By the considerations based on Gaussian elimination 
each of the diagonal elements a;; is the coefficient of 
some variable x;, determined by the equation e;. Each 
of the other non-zero elements left of au denotes pres­
ence in the equation e; of a variable that is determined 
before x;, that is a direct predecessor of x; in the causal 
ordering over S. 
r<==l If each equation determines exactly one variable, 
itl'Oil'ows that at each level in the procedure of extract­
ing the causal ordering, there are only self-contained 
structures of degree one, which in turn guarantees 
acyclicity of the causal graph. 0 
Each equation in the simultaneous equations model S 
constructed in the proof of the Theorem 1 involves a 
node in the graph representing the BBN B and all its 
immediate predecessors. By Theorem 2, the causal 
g�aph of S derived by the method of causal ordering 
will have the same structure as B. This observation 
and its implications are formalized in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem-""3 (causality in BBNs) A Bayesian be­
lief network 8 reflects the causal structure of a sys­
tem if and only if {1) each node of B and all its direct 
predecessors describe variables involved in a separate 
mechanism in the syste� and (2) each node with no 
1redecessors represents an exogenous variable.
�" 
� 
Proof: By Theorem 1, there exists a simultane­
ous equations system S that is equivalent to B. Each 
equation in S involves a node of B and all its direct 
predecessors. We know that B is acyclic, so by Theo­
rem 2 the structure of B is equivalent to the structure 
of a causal graph obtained by the method of causal 
ordering from S. 
By the assumptions underlying causal ordering, B re­
flects the causal structure of the underlying system if 
and only if S is a structural model of that system i.e. 
if each of its equations is a structural equation and 'each 
of its exogenous variables is a true exogenous variable. 
This is what the theorem states. 0 
4 CONCLUSION 
Knowledge of causal asymmetries in a system is neces­
sary in predicting the effects of changes in the structure 
of the system and, because of the role of causality in 
human reasoning, is essential in human-computer in­
terfaces to decision support systems. Although many 
researchers refer to the concept of causality, there 
seems to be no consensus as to what causality in BBN 
models means and how BBNs' directed arcs should be 
interpreted. We reviewed the mechanism-based view 
of causality in structural equations models and we have 
shown that it is applicable to BBN models. We have 
explicated the conditions that need to be satisfied in 
order for a BBN to be a causal model. 
Theorem 3 demonstrates that directed arcs in BBNs 
i: i'.(.) �� 'f.;. � \� ( 1\�) £�) 
-·� -/'1.(.\.'JOO.S ! ct.YI'f '/ar;cJolt_ C!>-v\ � �� �>\��-
play a role that is similar in its representational power 
to the structure (in terms of the presence or absence of 
variables in equations) of simultaneous equations mod­
els. We can view the graphical structure of a BBN as 
a qualitative specification of the mechanisms acting 
in a system. Similarly to the mathematical transfor­
mations on structural equations models (such as row 
combination in linear models), we can obtain BBNs 
that are equivalent with respect to the probability dis­
tribution of its variables by reversing network's arcs. 
However, similarly to simultaneous equations models, 
such transformations will lead to loss of structural in­
formation. There is only one graphical structure that 
fulfills the semantic requirements stated in the theo­
rem and can be given a causal interpretation. 
Our analysis shows how prior theoretical knowledge 
about a domain , captured in structural equations, can 
aid construction of BBNs. Given the assumption of 
acyclicity, an equation involves a node and all its di­
rect predecessors, as shown in Theorem 2 .. This pro­
vides valuable information about adjacencies in the 
constructed network. Currently, both, the structure 
and the numerical probability distributions in BBNs 
are elicited from a human expert and are a reflection 
of the expert's subjective view of a real world system. 
Existing theoretical knowledge, if incorporated at the 
model building stage, should aid human experts, make 
model building easier, and, finally, improve the quality 
of constructed models. 
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